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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
W. E. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
H. R. ESPEY,
Defendant,

Case No. 9251

and
J. H. MORGAN, SR.
Defendant and
Cross Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Reference in appellant's brief to the transcript will be
designated by the letter "R." The parties will be referred
to as in the court below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case arises out of a transaction entered into in
August of 1954 at a time when the uranium "fever" in the
State of Utah was reaching epidemic proportions.
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Defendant, Espey, a non-resi<ient, contacted plaintiff
on August 24, 1954 and asked to borrow up to $10,000.00
from plaintiff (R-43). After some negotiating which will
be referred to in more detail later, plaintiff did loan defendant Espey $2,500.00 and in consideration therefore
received a promissory note signed by defendant Espey and
endorsed in blank by defendant Morgan (Ex. P-2) together
with an agreement between defendants Espey and Morgan
jointly as first parties and plaintiff as second party (Ex.
P. 1). The principal controversy involves the construction
of this agreement and the circumstances surrounding it.
In consideration of the loan, the defendants agreed
to deliver a note in the sum of $2,500.00 bearing 6% interest for a period of five months and in addition the defendants, pursuant to the agreement, gave plaintiff several
options to purchase uranium stocks and/or to receive an
interest in certain uranium claims.
Paragraph 1 of the agreement provides:
"Espey agrees to execute and deliver a Note in the
sum of Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00)
bearing six per cent (6%) interest for a period of five
(5) months from date hereof. To secure said note,
Espey authorizes J. H. Morgan, Sr. to hold for him
in trust, seventy-five hundred shares (7500) of the
White Canyon Mining Company stock to be delivered to Second Party upon failure to pay the
Note when due."
Paragraph 2 of the agreement gave three independent
options to plaintiff as additional consideration with the
provision that he could elect to choose one of the three.
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There is no particular controversy over these three options
contained in paragraph 2 inasmuch as plaintiff did not
attempt to exercise any of them. However, paragraph 2
contains the following language in addition to the three
options referred to:
"An [as] additional consideration for said loan and
irrespective of which option Second Party exercises,
First Parties agree to give Second Party an option
on twenty-five hundred shares (2500) of White
Canyon Mining Company stock at eighty cents (80c)
per share, said option to be exercised on or before
eighteen (18) ~onths from completion of the public
offering.''
The note executed by Espey and endorsed by Morgan
became due on January 24, 1955, five months after its
execution. Plaintiff attempted unsuccessfully to contact
defendant Morgan a few days prior to the due date of the
note, (R. 46-7) and finally contacted him some time between four to ten days after the due date and made an
appointment to meet him in his office. (R. 47) Defendant
Morgan was surprised that Espey had failed to pay the
note when due and offered to make payment to plaintiff
himself. However, when plaintiff pointed out the options
contained in the agreement and attempted to exercise the
option to p·urchase the additional 2500 shares of White
Canyon Mining Company stock at 80 cents per share, defendant Morgan refused to make any payment and indicated to plaintiff that the agreement in his opinion was
usurious and plaintiff left Morgan's office without any
satisfaction either by way of cash or stock. (R. 47-49)
Plaintiff then contacted an attorney and as a result
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thereof a letter was written to defendants demanding delivery of 7500 shares of White Canyon stock by reason of
the failure to pay the note at maturity and also again
exercising the option to purchase an additional 2500 shares
of White Canyon Mining Company stock at 80 cents per
share. (Ex. P-5)
Some time after the action was commenced, Morgan
paid $2,500.00 plus interest to the Clerk of the Court. The
case was tried to the Court sitting without a jury and the
Court found that the 7500 shares of stock held by Morgan
was held as security only and that the plaintiff was not
entitled to it unless it became necessary to sell the stock
to pay the $2,500.00 note. Judgment for $2,500.00 plus
interest from August 24, 1955 was entered in favor of
plaintiff. The court further found that plaintiff properly
exercised his option to purchase an additional 2500 shares
of White Canyon Mining Company stock at 80 cents a
share, that Morgan refused ·to deliver the stock to plaintiff,
that such refusal damaged plaintiff in the amount of
$2,525.00, that sum being the difference between the 80
cent option purchase price and $1.81 which was the price
at which plaintiff could subsequently have sold the stock
had it been delivered to him. The court also awarded
$500.00 attorney's fees.
Plaintiff appealed from the court's Finding and Conclusion that the 7500 shares of stock was to be held as security only, it being plaintiff's contention that the stock
should have been delivered by Morgan to plaintiff since the
note was not paid when due and that plaintiff is entitled to
all right, title and interest in and to said stock and that the
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failure to so deliver the stock upon default in payment of
the note, constituted a conversion thereof by Morgan.
Defendant Morgan has cross-appealed contending that
the court erred in awarding damages in the amount of
$2,525·.00 for the wrongful refusal of defendants to allow
plaintiff to exercise his option to purchase 2500 shares of
White Canyon Mining Company stock at 80 cents per share
and also contending that plaintiff is not entitled to the
attorney fees awarded.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE 7500 SHARES OF WHITE CANYON
MINING COMPANY STOCK WAS HELD BY
DEFENDANT MORGAN AS SECURITY ONLY.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO FIND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED
TO ALL RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST TO
THE 7500 SHARES OF WHITE CANYON MINING COMPANY STOCK UPON FAILURE OF DEFENDANTS TO PAY THE NOTE ON MATURITY.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO FIND THAT THE REFUSAL TO DELIVER
THE 7500 SHARES OF WHITE CANYON MINING COMPANY STOCK TO PLAINTIFF UPON
FAILURE TO PAY THE NOTE CONSTITUTED
A CONVERSION THEREOF BY DEFENDANT
MORGAN.
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POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO AWARD TO PLAINTIFF THE ADDDITIONAL SUM OF $13,575.00 FOR DAMAGE S
RESULTING FROM DEFENDANT MORGAN'S
WRONGFUL REFUSAL TO DELIVER 7500
SHARES OF WHITE CANYON MINING COMPANY STOCK TO PLAINTIFF UPON DEFAULT
OF PAYMENT OF' THE PROMISSORY NOTE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE 7500 SHARES OF WHITE CANYON
MINING COMPANY STOCK WAS HELD BY
DEFENDANT MORGAN AS SECURITY ONLY.

In determining the effect of the agreement under consideration, we think it important to keep in mind the
circumstances surrounding the transaction. Defendant
Espey was a uranium promoter. He was a non-resident of
this state and a complete stranger to plaintiff. He voluntarily contacted plaintiff on August 24, 1954 (R. 40) for
the purpose of raising money to finance various uranium
ventures (R. 42, 43) and originally asked plaintiff for
$10,000.00. Plaintiff exp·lained that he was not in the business of loaning money, that he was not interested in
loaning money, that it would be- foolish to loan that kind
of money for such a purpose to a complete stranger, whereupon defendant Espey volunteered to include as consideration for the money various stock options and as a result
plaintiff indicated that if some local citizen with a good
reputation would stand behind the transaction, he might
possibly go along. Mr. Espey volunteered Mr. Morgan's
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name and indicated he would talk to him and call back
on plaintiff the same day. (R. 43-44)
Espey returned with the note and agreement which
are the subject of this action and which are identified as
plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2.
Paragraph 1 of the agreement provides that in consideration of the loaning of the money,
"Espey agrees to execute and deliver a note in the
sum of Twenty-five Hundred Dollars ($2500.00)
bearing six per cent (6%) interest, for a peTiod of
five (5-) months from date hereof. To secure said
Note Espey authorizes J. H. Morgan, Sr. to hold
for him in trust seventy-five hundred shares (7500)
of the White Canyon Mining Company stock to be
delivered to Second Party upon failure to pay the
Note when due."
It is this language which the court construed in holding that the 7500 shares of stock was held as security
only. Plaintiff earnestly contends that such finding was in
error and that the court should have found that the stock
was not held as security but was held in trust by Morgan
to be delivered to plaintiff in the event the note was not
paid at maturity and that plaintiff was entitled to all right,
title and interest thereto.
While it is true the language of the instrument uses
the words "to secure'' we think those words are unimportant when the agreement is properly construed and we
think it clearly was not the intent of the parties that the
7500 shares of stock represent a pledge of security only.
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It is important to bear in mind that defendants Morgan and Espey are co-obligors in this agreement and that
the stock was delivered from Espey to Morgan to hold in
trust to be delivered to plaintiff if and only if the note was
not paid at maturity. In other words, the possession of the
stock was never in plaintiff (and plaintiff has not yet received one share thereof) and under the terms of the agreement, plaintiff was not even entitled to possession until and
unless the note was not paid at maturity.
The whole theory behind a pledge of security is that
possession is transferred immediately to the obligee, so
that if the obligor does not perform, the obligee then
merely has to liquidate the security and retain from the
liquidated funds the amount of the debt. However, where
possssion is not transferred from the obligor or debtor to
the creditor or obligee, it is obvious there is no pledge of
security involved. There appears to be no conflict in the
law on this subject.
In 41 Am. Jur., 586, it is stated:
"the essential elements and requisites of a pledge
are (1) the existence of a debt or obligation, and (2)
the transfer of property to be held as secu1·ity, and,
if necessary, used, for the payment thereof."
(Emphasis added)
This court in the case of Campbell v. Peter, 108 Utah
565, 162 Pac. 2d 754 held:
''A pledge . . . is the passing of the possession of a
chattel by the owner thereof to the pledgee who
is thereby entitled to hold it until the debt is paid
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or the obligation performed."
The mere characterization of a transaction as "security," "collateral" or "pledge" does not make it such, the
intention of the parties as to the nature of the transaction
is the controlling element. In 41 Am. Jur., 585 it is stated:
"This intention or conduct is ascertained from the
whole instrument evidencing the transaction, and
not from particular words therein. Thus, the fact
that the word 'pledge' is employed in an instrument
evidencing a transaction does not conclusively determine its character... "
It has consistently been held delivery is essential to
a valid pledge. The court in Hodge v. Truax, 184 Wash.
360, 51 Pac. 2d 357 stated;
"One of the prime requisites of a pledge is that the
pledgor has parted with his property and that the
pledgee has possession or control over it."
This court in Campbell v. Peter, supra, stated:
"A pledge to be valid depends upon possession by
the pledgee or his agent, either actual or constructive, of the chattel at all times until the fulfillment
of the obligation which it secures ... Possession is
an essentional element of a pledge and without it
there can be no pledge."
These principles are forcefully set forth in 41 Am. Jur.,
592-593 as follows:
" ... it is essential to a consummated contract of
pledge that there shall have been a delivery of the
pledged property,- either actual or constructive, to
the pledgee or to a pledge holder. Good faith does
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not avail the pledgee either actual or constructive.
Until the act of delivery has been perfor~ed the
special property which the pledgee is entitled to
hold does not vest in him. The requirement of possession is an inexorable rule of law, ... Generally,
delivery must have been as complete as the nature
of the property permits. The pledgee's possssion, to
be effective either for notice or to give validity at
law to the pledge, must be complete, unequivocal,
and exclusive of the pledgor's possession in his
own right."
Actual delivery to and possession by the creditor is
a prime requi~ite in order to constitute a pledge. It is possible, however, that delivery can be made to a third person for and on behalf of the creditor to constitute a constructive delivery, but it is apparent that such was not
the case here. Morgan, the so-called pledge holder, was
not selected by plaintiff as is required by law in order to
constitute a constructive delivery. See 41 Am. Jur., 599.
In fact, Morgan was a co-obligor in the agreement and a
close associate of defendant Espey. Further, the language
of the agreement itself gives plaintiff no right to the requisite possession unless and until the note is not paid at
maturity, nor was Morgan authorized to deliver the stock
to plaintiff until that time. Certainly this is not constructive
delivery in any sense.
Where there is a close relationship beween the pledgor and the stake holder, the alleged fulfillment of the requirement of delivery should be carefully scrutinized in
view of the real danger that the actual control may
never be surrendered by the debtor-pledgor.
In the
instant case there was and is such a close relationship
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between defendants Espey and Morgan. They are co-obligors in this transaction, both having signed the promissory
note and they together constitute "parties of the first part"
for the purposes of the agreement under consideration.
They are also closely associated as stockholders of the
White Canyon Mining Company. The closeness of the relationship indicates that the pledgor herein never relinquished actual control over the stock.
The Supreme Court of Washington passed on this
type situation in the case of Kietz v. Gold Point Mines, Inc.
105 Pac. 2d, 71. In that case the plaintiff loaned a thousand
dollars to defendant company and entered into a·greement
whereby it was clearly spelled out that 25,000 shares of
stock was to be pledged and assigned to plaintiff as security for the note and the agreement further spelled out the
intent of the parties by indicating that plaintiff was to
transfer the stock back to defendant upon payment of the
note. The stock certificate, however was retained by the
secretary of the defendant corporation. The court held that
there was no pledge of the stock because possession had
not been transferred to plaintiff. The following language is,
we think, important:
"In passing upon the question of necessity of delivery of personal property to complete a pledge,
this court stated in Kuhn v. Groll, 118 Wash. 285,
203 P. 44, 47:
'It is true that the law requires a delivery of the
pledged property from the pledgor to the pledgee
and a retention of it by the pledgee in order to make
the pledge fully effectual as security. We think the
law applicable to the situaiiori we find here is well
stated in 21 R.C.L. 643, as follows:
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' "The requirement of possession is an inexor~ble
rule of law, adopted to prevent fraud and deception,
for, if the debtor remains in possession, the law
presumes that those who deal with him do so on
the faith of his being the unqualified owner of the
goods." ' "
It is essential to the existance of a constructive pledge
that the pledgee creditor have the continuous right to possession of the pledged article. This, of course, was not the
case herein. The very fact that it is necessary to sue for
possession of the stock in question, indicates that the creditor herein has not had and does not have the actual or
constructive possession of the stock in question.
This litigation is not the usual type which arises
in the case of a pledge. In the typical case it is the
pledgor who must sue the pledgee for return of the article
which was transferred for security, but here since possession was never transferred, it is the creditor who now is
forced to sue for possession of the stock to which he was
clearly entitled upon default in payment of the note.
The language of this agreement is in the alternative.
The obligors, defendants Morgan and Espey intended to
be able to discharge the $2,500.00 obligation by deliYery
of the stock, should it be reduced in value. In other words,
the agreement gives defendants the choice of paying the
note when due or in lieu thereof delivering the stock.
A finding that the stock was not given as security
but was in fact to be given in lieu of payment of the note
at the option of the defendants, is not only compelled by'
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the law, but also by the facts surrounding the transaction.
Mr. Williams testified that he was not in the business of
loaning money and certainly would not loan money to a
stranger at 6% interest. (R. 43) He further testified that it
was his understanding that if the stock had gone down
in value, the defendants could have satisfied their obligation to him insofar as the $2,500.00 loan was concerned
by delivering 7500 shares of stock. If in fact the stock had
been worth less than $2,500.00 at the time the note was
due, there is no doubt but that the defendants would have
satisfied their obligation by transferring the 7500 shares
of stock to p·laintiff. Plaintiff was willing to take the
gamble of such a transaction with the hope that even
should he be forced to accept the stock with a then value
less than the note amount, the stock would subsequently
achieve a substantial increase in value. Furthermore, it
is important to remember that the defendants gave plaintiff several other options covering other stocks as additional consideration for advancing the $2,500.00 and the
transaction took place during the highly speculative period involving the uranium boom in Utah. At that time
uranium stock values were an unknown factor and
fluctuated wildly.

-

The total lack of delivery of the alleged "security"
to either the creditor or to a bona fide pledge-holder
coupled with the clear import of the language of the agreement that the 7500 shares of stock were to be paid over
in their entirety upon default of payment of the note,
cannot but compel the conclusion that the stock was not
given Morgan as security.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL CO·URT ERRED IN F AI LIN<;}
TO F1ND THAT PLAINTIFYF WAS ENTITLED
TO ALL RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST TO
THE 7500 SHARES OF WHITE, CANYON MINING COMPANY STOCK UPON FAILURE OF DEFENDANTS TO PAY THE NOTE ON MATURITY.

Insofar as the 7500 shares of stock is concerned, defendant Morgan is a mere naked trustee and nothing more.
The alternative agreement authorizes Morgan to hold the
stock in trust for Espey to be delivered to plaintiff upon
failure to pay the note when due. (Defendant Espey did
not appear at the trial and has been heard from only once,
by telephone, since the transaction was entered into, and
then some one and one-half to two years after the transaction. (R. 45) Counsel for both defendants indicated the
whereabouts of Espey was and is unknown and that he
may well be dead (R. 36 & 61). This agreement gave
Morgan no right or interest whatever in the stock. It
remained the property of Espey until and unless given
over to plaintiff. Morgan's obligation with respect to the
stock is clearly set forth in the agreement. In the event
the note was paid, he was, as trustee, to return it to defendant Espey. In the event the note was not paid at
maturity, he was to deliver it absolutely and with no
qualifications to plaintiff. Under no circumstances could
he claim it as his own.
There can be no question that the note was not paid
at maturity and that actions of Morgan when demand was
made for payment do not constitute an offer of payment.
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When Mr. Williams called on defendant Morgan in
connection with this transaction approximately one week
to 10 days after the note was due, it is true that Morgan
initially made an offer to make payment of the $2,500.00.
But this offer was clearly conditional inasmuch as when
plaintiff mentioned the options connected with _the agreement, defendant Morgan, although expressing no concern
in connection with the Coyote interest, totally refused all
payment when plaintiff mentioned the White Canyon option on page 2 of the agreement granting plaintiff the
option to purchase an additional 2500 shares of White
Canyon stock at 80 cents per share. Upon mention of this
option, Morgan immediately withdrew his offer to make
payment of the note and said: "I'll see you in hell first
on that one. You will not get it." (R. 48)
It is elementary that a
ineffectual.

conditional tender

is

Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Volume 6,
Section 1814 states:
" ... a tender of performance of an absolute obligation of the debtor must be unconditional, since
the debt itself is unconditional. No tender can be
effective if its acceptance would prejudice the creditor's rights;"
"Therefore, a condition that a payment shall be
taken in full discharge or as a compromise of the
debtor's obligation, or that the creditor shall give
a receipt in full of all demands, ... invalidates a
tender."
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This court has held that a tender of less than the
amount due, if refused, has no legal significance and that
nothing short of everything that the creditor is entitled to
receive is a sufficient tender. Siverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d
351, 273 Pac. 2d, 974. See also the annotation in 5 A. L. R.
1226 which cites the general rule that:
"A tender must include everything to which the
creditor is entitled, and a tender of any less sum
is nugatory and ineffective as a tender."
See also 52 Am. J ur., 230.
The offer by Morgan to make payment of the note
alone was conditioned upon plaintiff's willingness to waive
this right and relinquish this option. Certainly such a
tender is totally ineffective.
The court properly found that plaintiff did exercise
this option to which he was unquestionably entitled regardless of whether Morgan paid the note or gave up the
7500 shares of stock, and that the failure of defendant Morgan to sell the stock to plaintiff at the option price resulted
in plaintiff's damage in the amount of $2,5-25.00. Since
plaintiff has been held by the lower court to be fully entitled to exercise the option, it is apparent that the tender of
payment of the note conditioned upon the waiver of that
right was no tender at all. We submit, therefore, that the
note payment was in default and that upon such default by
the clear intent of the contract, plaintiff was entitled to
have the stock delivered to him according to the terms of
the agreement and that such delivery should pass all right,
title and interest thereto in lieu of the payment of the
promissory note.
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO FIND THAT THE REFUSAL TO DELIVER
THE 7500 SHARES OF WHITE CANYON MINING COMPANY STOCK TO PLAINTIFF UPON
FAILURE TO PAY THE NOTE CONSTITUTED
A CONVERSION THEREOF BY DEFENDANT
MORGAN.
The 7500 shares of stock in question do not under any
circumstances belong to defendant Morgan. He is merely
a trustee or at least a bailee with instructions to hold the
stock for the use and benefit of Espey until the note matures and at maturity, in the event the note is not paid,
to deliver the stock to plaintiff. The wrongful refusal to
deliver the stock to plaintiff upon failure to pay the note
at maturity, constitutes a conversion thereof. The general
rule is stated in 53 Am. Jur., 822 as follows:
''The gist of a conversion has been declared to be
not the acquisition of the property by the wrongdoer, but the wrongful deprivation of a person of
property to the possession of which he is entitled.
A conversion consists of an act in derogation of
the plaintiff's possessory rights, and any wrongful
exercise or assumption of authority over another's
goods, depriving him of the possession, permanently or for an indefinite time, is a conversion."
This court in the case of Christensen v. Pugh, 84 Utah
440, 36 Pac. 2d 100, quoted with approval the definition
found in 2 Greenleaf on Evid. Section 642 as follows:
"Conversion consists either in the appropriation of
a thing to the party's own use and beneficial enjoyment, or in its destruction, or in exercising do-
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minion over it in exclusion or defiance of the
owner's right ~r in withholding the possession of
the property from the owner under a claim of title
inconsistent with his own.''
The court went on to say:
"The gist of conversion is not the acquisition of
property by a wrongdoer, but the wrongful deprivation of it to the owner."
We submit that there can be no question concerning
Morgan's conversion of the stock.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO AWARD TO PLAINTIFF THE ADDDITIONAL SUM OF $13,575.00 FOR DAMAGE S
RESULTING FROM DEFENDANT MORGAN'S
WRONGFUL REFUSAL TO DELIVER 7500
SHARES OF WHITE CANYON MINING COMPANY STOCK TO PLAINTIFF UPON DEFAULT
OF PAYMENT OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE.
Plaintiff introduced, without objection by defendants,
a letter from J. A. Hogle and Company, (Ex. P-4) indicating that the highest market value of the White Canyon
Mining Company stock was reached on October 16, 1955,
some nine months after plaintiff was entitled to the stockthat price being $1.81 per share.
The measure of damages for conversion of a chattel
of fluctuating value is the highest market value between
the conversion and either a reasonable time thereafter or
between the conversion and the date of trial. See 53 Am.
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Jr., 891; 40 A. L. R. 1288 and 87 A. L. R. 818. The high
market value of $1.81 occurring only nine months from
date of conversion would allow plaintiff to recover at that
figure under either rule stated above.
On the basis of the evidence and the· above rule, the
trial court properly assessed plaintiff's damages for defendants' failure to allow exercise of the option to purchase
2500 shares on the basis of $1.01 per share, the difference
between the option price of $.80 and the high market value
of $1.81. Utilizing this same evidence and rule of law plaintiff's damage for the withholding of the 7500 shares of stock
amounts $13,575.00. Plaintiff should have receiyed 7500
shares of stock, upon the failure to pay the note, at no cost
hence his damage by defendant Morgan's wrongful refusal
amounts to a loss of the full price of $1.81 for each of the
7500 shares wrongfull withheld, or $13,575.00.
Defendant failed to raise any objection to this measure
of damage either at the trial or in connection with the
points raised on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff contends that the trial court committed reversible error in holdirig- that the 7500 shares of White
Canyon Mining Company stock was held by defendant
Morgan as security only and that under the contract and
the circumstances surrounding the execution thereof, it
is clear that the stock was not pledged as security but was
given to defendant Morgan in trust to be delivered to
plaintiff with full right, title and interest thereto in the
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event the note was not paid. The note was not paid and
has not been paid and defendant Morgan has wrongfully
converted the stock to his own use and deprived plaintiff
of it thereby preventing plaintiff from selling same at the
high market value of $1.81 per share, damaging plaintiff
in the sum of $13,575.00 rather than the $2,500.00 plus
interest as payment of the note, awarded by the court.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the trial court's
decision insofar as it considered the 7500 shares of stock
as security should be reversed and judgment entered in
favor of plaintiff for $13,575.00 damages for the wrongful
convers1on of said stock in addition to the attorney's fees
awarded and the $2,525.00 awarded for the option stock.
Respectfully submitted,
MARK K. BOYLE,
RICHARD R. BOYLE,
Attorneys for Appellant

345 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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